The terms such as contradiction, contrary, subcontrary, subaltern, entailment, and so on, are commonly referred as a kind of the labels on opposition by inference in Aristotle’s square of opposition and in modern semantics. But their definitions or applications into referring to the propositional oppositions are often conflicted each other between in Aristotle’s square of opposition and in modern semantics. This paper aims to review what is the definitions of the terms on the oppositions and how to apply the terms to the oppositions in modern semantics and in Aristotle’s immediate inferences. And we try to reveal the reasons that the same terms are used differently in Aristotle’s square of opposition and in modern semantics. As a result, we have found the fact that such terms are differently applied between to Aristotle’s square of opposition and to the modern semantics, because the terms on them have been differently defined with reference to the immediate inference, to the truth conditions, or to the proposition itself.